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ARGUMENT 
Hiding behind the label "non-profit mutual water company," Respondents argue 
that the Public Service Commission ("Commission") is without authority to even 
investigate the conduct of Summit Water Distribution Company ("SWDC") or the non-
consumer shareholders who control and manipulate it. But such an argument ignores the 
reality that SWDC is not operating as a consumer-controlled mutual non-profit water 
company but is instead operating as a vast, unregulated, for-profit moneymaking scheme 
to benefit the Saunders/Knowles Respondents, who control it. Additionally, this 
argument ignores the fact that SWDC's Class B shareholder-consumers are, as a practical 
matter, disenfranchised and have no meaningful ability to govern SWDC due to their 
permanent minority status and the Saunders/Knowles Respondents' unbroken and 
unyielding control of SWDC. Finally, Respondents urge this Court to merely wink at the 
non-consumer domination and control of SWDC, ignoring the fact that the 
Saunders/Knowles Respondents' domination of SWDC has resulted in substantial harm 
to the consumer-shareholders. 
Since Utah law provides that Commission jurisdiction is based on the substance, 
not form, the Commission erred in refusing to even investigate whether SWDC is 
functioning as a bona fide mutual water company or true cooperative. Thus, its order 
should be reversed and the cause remanded. 
I. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT 
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 
Attempting to avoid an investigation, which would bring to light the full extent of 
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Saunders5 and Knowles' manipulation and control of, and profits received from, SWDC, 
the Respondents defend the Commission's misapplication of Garkane Power Co. v. 
Public Service Commission, 100 P.2d 571 (Utah 1940), by arguing that the factor of 
serving the public generally is essentially a "condition precedent" to the Commission's 
jurisdiction. (Br. of SWDC at 17.) Thus, according to SWDC, "none of the[] additional 
considerations [referenced in Garkane] is sufficient to establish jurisdiction where the 
initial step of serving the public is not present." {Id. at 18.) However, this argument 
misstates this Court's holding in Garkane and fails to recognize that the Complaint 
properly alleged that SWDC qualifies as a public utility.1 More importantly, however, 
SWDC's argument misses the forest for the trees. While Garkane set forth its test for 
"serving the public generally," it expressly held that such a test is inapplicable if the 
entity is not a bona fide cooperative but is instead a "device prepared and operated to 
evade or circumvent the law." Garkane, 100 P.2d at 573. Thus, any determination of 
jurisdiction necessarily required the Commission to first resolve the claim that SWDC 
does not operate as a bona fide cooperative. As the Commission failed to do so, its Order 
should be reversed. 
A. Bear Hollow's Complaint Alleged that SWDC Is a Public Utility 
/. Bear Hollow Alleged that SWDC Serves the General Public 
a. Membership in SWDC Is Offered to the General Public 
In its brief, SWDC essentially asserts that a utility serving only its shareholders 
This, alone, is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction to conduct an investigation. See, e.g., In 
re Wilkinson Cottonwood Mut. Water Co., Docket No. 09-019-01, at 2 (Feb. 22, 2010), 
Add. G, Br. of Bear Hollow.) 
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may never qualify as a "public utility." However, this is contrary to the analysis and 
holding in Garkane} In Garkane, this Court held that "[t]he essential feature of a public 
use is that it is not confined to privileged individuals, but i§ open to the indefinite public." 
100 P.2d at 573 (internal quotations omitted). Not surprisingly, then, the question of 
whether the cooperative had the power to select its members was fundamental to the 
Court's determination of whether the entity was a public utility. See id. Thus, contrary 
to what Respondents urge, there is no singular, "service-to^shareholders only" exemption 
or test created by Garkane. Rather, the threshold analysis under Garkane requires the 
showing of two separate components before obtaining an exemption: "So long as a 
cooperative serves only its owner-members and so long as it has the right to select those 
who become members, ordinarily it matters not that 5 or 1()00 people are members or that 
a few or all the people in a given area are accorded niembership...." Id. (emphasis 
added)). 
Thus, assuming arguendo that Bear Hollow had not alleged that SWDC provides 
water service to non-shareholders, SWDC still qualifies as a public utility because it 
cannot show that it has the ability to select its members, as required by Garkane. For 
example, it is uncontested that Saunders and Knowles arel in the business of selling their 
Class A shares to the general public. (R.l at ff 90, 92, 122, 124-25.) Because their 
shares are "unique in that they are not dedicated to any specifically identified property 
development," (R.l 1, Ex.A at f 37), the shares may be sold to anyone of Saunders' and 
Under this theory, a for-profit utility could issue one share of non-voting, non-dividend 
entitled stock to each consumer it serves and thereby avoid Commission regulation. 
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Knowles' choosing, without SWDC's consent or authorization. Thus, membership is not 
restricted to those selected or approved by the Board but is instead granted to anyone 
willing to pay the price demanded by Saunders and Knowles. 
Moreover, even excluding from consideration Saunders' and Knowles' very 
lucrative transactions, SWDC nonetheless qualifies as a public utility because its Class B 
(use/consumer) shares are appurtenant to, and inseparable from, the land upon which the 
water is used. (R.l at *§ 76.) This means that any member of the general public who 
buys land to which a Class B consumer share has been dedicated is automatically entitled 
to membership and service. As a result, SWDC has no ability to select those who may 
become members but instead must hold open membership to anyone in the general public 
who has purchased or may purchase property to which a Class B share has been 
dedicated. As a result, SWDC is every bit as bound to provide water to consumers 
purchasing appurtenant land in its sendee areas, such as Jeremy Ranch, as Rocky 
Mountain Power and Questar are obligated to provide service to consumers purchasing 
homes with appurtenant utility hook-ups or as Utah Transit Authority is bound to provide 
transport to a paying busrider on one of its bus routes. And many of SWDC's consumers, 
like those residing in Jeremy Ranch, are as dependent upon SWDC for their water as they 
are upon Rocky Mountain Power for electricity and Questar for gas. (See n.4, infra.) 
Tacitly recognizing Garkane's requirement that it must have the "right to select 
3
 As noted by SWDC, the Commission concluded that this argument was outside the 
pleadings. (R. 23:12, 13.) Although such a conclusion is erroneous given that the 
Complaint alleged that Class B (use) shares are appurtenant, such an error was harmless 
because the Commission fully considered this argument on its merits. (R. 23:13.) 
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those who become members," 100 P.2d at 573, SWDC implies that, despite 
appurtenancy, issuance of Class B shares are nonetheless conditioned upon the approval 
of SWDC's Board. (Br. of SWDC at 22 ("If the new shareholders meet the requirements 
for service and [SWDC] approves their membership, they then are entitled to receive 
water ..•.")•) However, as evidenced by SWDC's bylaws, SWDC, unlike Garkane, has 
no discretion but must, in fact, issue a Class B share to the purchaser of land to which a 
share has been dedicated if the purchaser has paid all applicable fees and has agreed to 
comply with SWDC's articles and bylaws.4 Thus, unlike Garkane, SWDC does not have 
the power or ability to restrict its services to those selected by the company but must 
instead provide service to any member of the general public who has purchased land 
previously served by SWDC. Consequently, there is no difference between SWDC and 
Boulder King, which, as SWDC, itself, recognizes, qualified as a public utility (despite 
the fact that it served only shareholders) because it could not "choose its members as 
required by the Garkane decision, and [wa]s obligated to serve the public within its 
4
 Specifically, the bylaws provide that, "[ujpon compliance with the terms and conditions 
of this subsection [requiring the payment of fees and agreement to comply with articles 
and bylaws], water service shall be restored to the premises and the stock transfer 
accomplished." (R. 12:3 n.4 & Ex. A at 16-17 (emphasis added).) 
Although Bear Hollow did not attach SWDC's bylaws to its Complaint, it did 
attach the bylaws as an exhibit to its memorandum opposing SWDC's Motion to Dismiss. 
(R. 12:3 n.4 & Ex. A.) The Commission clearly considered such evidence, as recognized 
by its citation to footnote four of Bear Hollow's memorandum. (R. 23:13.) Such a 
consideration was proper, especially in light of the new allegations raised by SWDC in its 
motion to dismiss. See Stuart v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th 
Cir. 2001) ("In reviewing a factual attack, a court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, 
other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional 
facts. In the course of a factual attack under Rule 12(b)(1), a court's reference to 
evidence outside the pleadings does not convert the motion into a Rule 56 motion." 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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service area."5 (In re Boulder King, Docket No. 02-2254-01 (Oct. 16, 2002), at 3, Add. H 
to Br. of Bear Hollow.) 
Respondents make much ado concerning the fact that appurtenant homebuyers 
must agree to comply with SWDC's rules and regulations. But this uncontroversial 
proposition common to all public utilities does not equate to a finding that SWDC has the 
ability to "select" its members. If such were the case, UTA would be transformed to a 
non-public service provider simply because it denies service to those riders who are not 
appropriately clothed or refuse to pay a fare, as required by its rules and regulations. 
Rocky Mountain Power and Questar would likewise be transformed to non-public 
utilities simply because they require a hook-up fee, completion of a service application, 
and credit checks for new customers, reserving the right to deny service if their rules and 
regulations are not met. Clearly, retaining the ability to enforce its rules does not change 
the character of a public utility. 
SWDC also argues that the concerns discussed in Garkane are not present in this 
case. Specifically, SWDC argues that Garkane was concerned with the sale of "power to 
nonmembers, who would not be subject to the same controls and owner-consumer 
incentives that obviate the need for regulation." (Br. of SWDC at 23.) However, as 
discussed in Bear Hollow's opening brief, this concern is, in fact, the driving force in this 
5
 It must be noted that many of SWDC's consumers are likewise unable to choose their 
water provider but instead must receive service from SWDC. For example, a member of 
the general public purchasing a home in Jeremy Ranch may only receive service from 
SWDC. (R. 12:4.) And, although such a consumer/homebuyer would be considered a 
"shareholder" in SWDC, he or she would have absolutely no say in the operations of the 
company due to the non-consumer Saunders/Knowles Respondents' absolute control. 
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case. Indeed, because the non-consumer Saunders/Knowles Respondents own more than 
50% of all outstanding shares of SWDC, the "Class B (use) shareholders, which are 
SWDC's rate-paying consumer-members, do not have it in their power to elect other 
directors ... and demand necessary changes or control the rate-making process." (R.l at 
f 93.) And, because there are no controls in place to protect SWDC's consumers, 
Saunders and Knowles are able to "profit[] tremendously by the commoditization of their 
Class A shares" to the "disadvantage^] [of] the shares and rights of others." (R.l at ^ 
122.) Thus, the concerns resulting from the conflict of interest between non-consumer 
owners and consumers that were found to be lacking in Garkane are very much at the 
forefront here. 
b. SWDC, through Saunders and Knowles, Engages in the Retail 
Sale of Culinary Water to the General Public 
SWDC does not dispute the validity of its many admissions made through its Anti-
Trust Complaint, such as its admission that it "compete[s] with respect to the sale, 
distribution and delivery of new water connections to developers and property owners" or 
that SWDC, together with certain of its Class A shareholders, such as Saunders and 
Knowles, "were the leading, largest and strongest competitor for the retail sale, 
distribution and delivery of water in the Snyderville Basin." (R. l l , Ex.A at fflf 55, 57.) 
Nor does SWDC attempt to explain the irreconcilable conflict between its position in the 
Anti-Trust Action, in which it seeks damages for an alleged restraint in trade, and its 
claims in this case, in which it denies that it engages in the retail sale of water to the 
general public. Rather, SWDC simply asserts that its Anti-Trust Complaint should be 
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ignored by this Court. (Br. of SWDC at 23 n. 12.) 
Although it is not surprising that SWDC would want to exclude these admissions, 
the fact remains that it was within the discretion of the Commission to consider such 
evidence when ruling upon SWDC's motion to dismiss. See Stuart, 271 F.3d at 1225 
(holding that a "court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a 
limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts" (internal quotations 
omitted)). As the Commission did not refuse to consider the Anti-Trust Complaint and 
instead stated it would consider the "factual allegations regarding [SWDC's] alleged 
service to the public" made in Bear Hollow's "responses to the Motions to Dismiss," (R. 
23:11 n.4), the Anti-Trust Complaint was properly before the Commission and is 
properly a part of the record.6 
It should also be noted that, while the Respondents' admissions in their Anti-Trust 
Complaint are confirming and illuminating, such admissions were not essential to 
invoking the Commission's jurisdiction to investigate. Indeed, because the substance of 
those admissions is set forth in Bear Hollow's Complaint, the allegations of the 
Complaint, alone, were sufficient to withstand the Respondents' motions to dismiss. 
For example, while it is helpful to rely on SWDC's own admission in its Anti-
Trust Complaint that the Respondents "have been and are now engaged in supplying 
culinary and other types of water for residential and commercial purposes in the 
Snyderville Basin, and particularly compete with respect to the sale, distribution and 
6
 Also, this Court may consider the Anti-Trust Complaint pursuant to the well-established 
rule that the Court may take judicial notice of public records. See, e.g., Green River 
Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50,1} 31 n.8, 84 P.3d 1134. 
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delivery of new water connections to developers and property owners," (R.l l , Ex.A at f 
57), Bear Hollow's Complaint alleged in a like fashion that "SWDC and [the 
Saunders/Knowles] Respondents are operating a 'public utility' as defined in Utah Code 
section 54-2-l(16)(a) and are engaged in the development, establishment, operation, and 
maintenance of public water service facilities in western Summit County, Utah" and that 
"SWDC and Respondents operate a vast, for-profit enterprise controlled and orchestrated 
by [the Saunders/Knowles Respondents]." (R.l at fflf 22, 2£.) 
And, while the Respondents concede in their Anti-Trust Complaint that "[t]hrough 
the sale of their Class A shares, the Investor Shareholders are engaged in the retail sale of 
culinary water that is then distributed and delivered by [SWDC] for commercial and 
residential use," (R.l 1, Ex.A at f^ 39), Bear Hollow's Complaint likewise alleged that the 
Saunders/Knowles Respondents, "with the help of SWDC, are marketing a valuable 
public resource—water—by selling Class A shares at whatever prices they dictate" and 
that the Saunders/Knowles Respondents, "with the help of SWDC, are maintaining a 
monopoly or near-monopoly on the purchase of Class A shares and the conversion of 
Class A shares to Class B shares." (R.l at ffif 124-25.) 
Finally, while it is telling that SWDC, itself, concedes in the Anti-Trust Complaint 
that the Saunders/Knowles Respondents receive preferential treatment in that they are 
given "unique" shares that are more marketable than the remaining shareholders' shares, 
(R.l l , Ex.A at \ 37), Bear Hollow's Complaint similarly alleged that the Respondents 
have caused the creation of two classes of Class A shares, thereby allowing the non-
consumer Saunders/Knowles Respondents to profit at the expense of the remaining 
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minority shareholders, stating as follows: 
119. [The Saunders/Knowles Respondents'] manipulation of SWDC's 
rules, regulations, and practices prohibiting or refusing the transfer of the 
Class A (development) share to the Buyer arbitrarily and unreasonably 
results in the creation of at least two classes of Class A shares—extremely 
valuable and fungible shares owned by [the Saunders/Knowles 
Respondents], which are readily marketable and not tethered to any 
particular piece of land within the Snyderville Basin, and worthless and 
unusable shares owned by parties such as Bear Hollow, which cannot be 
sold because they are tethered to a particular piece of land that does not 
need them. 
122. Even though Section 54-3-8 prohibits a public utility from 'mak[ing] 
or granting] any preference or advantage to any person, or subjecting] any 
person to any prejudice or disadvantage, [the Saunders/Knowles 
Respondents], acting through SK Resources and through their manipulation 
and control of SWDC, have created an enterprise whereby they have not 
only profited tremendously by the commoditization of their Class A shares 
but have also done so by prejudicing or disadvantaging the shares and 
rights of others, such as Bear Hollow, so as to stifle the ability of Bear 
Hollow and others to compete with them in providing Class A shares to the 
consuming public. 
( R . l a t ^ j H 9 , 122.) 
Thus, the Complaint properly pleaded that the Respondents have engaged, and 
continue to engage, in the retail sale of culinary water to the general public, thereby 
qualifying Respondents as a public utility. 
SWDC also argues that the allegations of the Complaint are "conclusory" and 
should be disregarded. However, as recognized by this Court, jurisdictional elements 
"must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive 
7
 The Anti-Trust Complaint serves to confirm allegations which must be considered as 
true at this stage of the proceedings. See, e.g., Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 
2004 UT 101, If 9, 104 P.3d 1226. 
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stages of the litigation." Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, f 14, 228 P.3d 747 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). Thus, as with this 
case, "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations ... may suffice, for on a motion 
to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are 
o 
necessary to support the claim." Id. (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561). 
c. SWDC Provides Water to the General Public 
Although Bear Hollow relied upon the shareholder list attached to its Complaint in 
arguing that SWDC serves the non-shareholder tenants of the Canyon Creek Apartments 
and other rented properties within SWDC's service area, (R. 12:4; 23:12), SWDC 
contends that such an argument was outside the pleadings. However, such a contention 
is contrary to the well-established rule that "documents attached to a complaint are 
incorporated into the pleadings for purposes of judicial notice and are fair game for this 
court to consider in addition to the complaint's averments." Oakwood Village, 2004 UT 
101 at K 10. Because it is reasonable to infer that the tenants of the Canyon Creek 
SWDC also claims that this issue was waived because Bear Hollow failed to raise it in 
its Request for Rehearing. However, the third ground for rehearing raised in Bear 
Hollow's Request stated that the "Complaint Properly Alleged Factual Allegations 
Supporting Jurisdiction." (R. 24:7.) The Request then argued that the Commission's 
dismissal, based on its determination that SWDC does not serve the public generally, was 
"contrary to the allegations of the Complaint and all reasonable inferences to be drawn 
from those allegations, which the Commission must construe in favor of Bear Hollow." 
(R. 24:7-8.) Although the Request did not repeat each and every factual allegation in the 
Complaint that supported a finding of jurisdiction, Bear Hollow preserved the issue 
regarding the sufficiency of its Complaint for purposes of this appeal. 
Despite this contention, SWDC concedes that the Commission considered the argument 
on its merits. (Br. of SWDC at 24.) 
SWDC also claims that this issue was waived because Bear Hollow did not raise it 
in its Request for Rehearing. However, as noted above, Bear Hollow's Request clearly 
identified the sufficiency of the Complaint as an issue for review. (R. 24:7.) 
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Apartments receive water directly from SWDC and pay for such services received, the 
Commission erred in concluding that Bear Hollow's contentions did not allege "anyone 
other than shareholders directly receive service from [SWDC]." (R. 23:13.) 
SWDC also argues that it is not reasonable to infer SWDC is providing service to 
non-shareholders merely because it serves an apartment complex of non-shareholder 
tenants, declaring "[ajccepting the logic of this argument would mean that merely 
allowing a guest to wash her hands or drink a glass of water grants that guest a legal 
entitlement to receive water service from [SWDC]." (Br. of SWDC at 24.) However, 
such a false analogy ignores the fact that tenants of the Canyon Creek Apartments, unlike 
a houseguest, are billed, pay for, and are legally entitled to the water service they receive. 
Thus, the non-shareholder tenants are customers and consumers of SWDC, and SWDC is 
therefore selling and delivering the water to the public generally. Accordingly, it was 
error for the Commission to conclude that SWDC was not a public utility. 
//. Section 54-2-1 Includes as a "Public Utility" Non-Profitf Mutual Culinary 
Water Companies 
Contrary to SWDC's assertion, the issue of statutory interpretation in this case is 
not whether the statutory exemption for irrigation companies "distributing water only to 
their stockholders," found in Section 54-2-1(29), is inapplicable to SWDC; rather, the 
issue is whether such an exemption shows that, contrary to the Commission's new 
interpretation,10 the Legislature did not intend to exempt from regulation both irrigation 
10
 As discussed in Section III, infra, the Commission's interpretation of "public utility" in 
this case represents a complete departure from, and abandonment of, its prior 
interpretation. 
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and culinary water companies that serve only their shareholders. Stated another way, 
Section 54-2-1(29) provides a "service-to-shareholders only" exemption to irrigation 
companies but omits any similar exemption for culinary water companies. Because 
"omissions in statutory language should be taken note of and given effect," such that "the 
expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of another," Biddle v. 
Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, \ 14, 993 P.2d 875 (internal quotations omitted), 
this Court can only conclude that the Legislature intended culinary water companies such 
as SWDC to be a "public utility" and that the mere fact that service may be limited to 
shareholders is insufficient to exempt such utilities from Commission regulation.11 
B. The Commission Erred in Refusing to Consider Bear Hollow's 
Allegations that SWDC Is Not a Bona Fide Non-Profit Company 
In an attempt to justify the Commission's refusal to investigate SWDC to 
determine whether it is operating as a bona fide non-profit mutual culinary water 
company and/or true cooperative, SWDC argues that the Commission lacked any power 
to even investigate because it does not have jurisdiction over SWDC. (Br. of SWDC at 
31.) However, such an argument fails for two independent reasons. First, it is axiomatic 
that a court or administrative agency has jurisdiction to determine if it has jurisdiction. 
11
 Contrary to SWDC's claim that Bear Hollow's interpretation of "public utility" would 
require this Court to apply one standard when dealing with water companies and a 
different standard when dealing with electrical or gas corporations, (Br. of SWDC at 29), 
the opposite is, in fact, true. Indeed, because the Legislature subsequently amended 
Section 54-2-1 to include as a public utility all gas and electrical corporations that 
provide service to their "members," 1965 Utah Laws 300, 304, the only entities that 
would escape regulation under the "service-to-shareholders" exemption advanced by 
SWDC would be culinary water companies. It is only if Section 54-2-1 is construed to 
include as public utilities culinary water companies serving shareholders that all gas, 
electrical, and water companies would be treated similarly under the statute. 
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See Varian-Eirnac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding 
that "the initial inquiry of any court [and quasi-judicial administrative agency] should 
always be to determine whether the requested action is within its jurisdiction"). If such 
were not the case, once challenged, the jurisdiction of the court or agency could never be 
determined. 
Second, SWDC fails to recognize that, under Garkane, the question of whether 
SWDC is operating as a bona fide non-profit is part and parcel of the question of whether 
the Commission has jurisdiction in the first place. Because an entity that is not operating 
as a bona fide cooperative, governed, controlled, and operated by consumers, is subject to 
the Commission's jurisdiction, Garkane, 100 P.2d at 573, the jurisdictional question 
could not properly be resolved in this case without first addressing Bear Hollow's factual 
allegations that, while it is a non-profit mutual water company in form, SWDC does not, 
in fact, operate as a true cooperative—i.e., that "SWDC and [the Saunders/Knowles] 
Respondents operate a vast, for-profit enterprise controlled and orchestrated by Saunders 
and Knowles."12 (R.l at f 25.) By disregarding this key element and instead holding that 
the sole dispositive factor to its analysis was application of a singular but non-existent 
"service-to-shareholders only" exemption,13 the Commission erred. 
12
 SWDC argues that the Commission should not make inquiries into whether an entity is 
operating in a manner contrary to its non-profit status, reasoning that the Commission 
does not have the power to order dissolution or reorganization. However, dissolution 
and/or reorganization have never been requested by Bear Hollow; rather, Bear Hollow 
simply requests that the Commission regulate SWDC, as it does all other for-profit utility 
companies, to ensure that the consumers' rights and interests are not trampled upon by 
those non-consumers controlling and operating the utility for personal gain. 
13
 The Commission held that "assuming as true the allegations that [SWDC] is a 'non-
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SWDC also urges this Court to disregard the uncontested allegations regarding 
Saunders' and Knowles' manipulation of, and control over, SWDC because, it asserts, 
Bear Hollow does not allege any "typical shareholder complaints," such as claims that 
SWDC "charges unfair rates" or that "some shareholders! pay less than others for their 
water service." (Br. of SWDC at 30-31.) However, such an assertion is inaccurate. Bear 
Hollow's Complaint is replete with allegations that, as a result of the non-consumer 
Saunders/Knowles Respondents' operation of SWDC as a for-profit moneymaking 
scheme, consumers are treated in a discriminatory manner. 
For example, Bear Hollow alleged (and the Anti-Trust Complaint confirms), that 
SWDC, under the Saunders/Knowles Respondents' control, has created "two classes of 
Class A shares—extremely valuable and fungible shares owned by [the 
Saunders/Knowles Respondents], which are readily marketable and not tethered to any 
particular piece of land..., and worthless and unusable shares owned by parties such as 
Bear Hollow, which cannot be sold because they are tethered to a particular piece of land 
that does not need them." (R.l at f 119.) The Complaint also alleged that the 
Saunders/Knowles Respondents have used their "extremely valuable and fungible" shares 
to sell culinary water at "whatever prices they dictate." (R.l at f^ 124.) And the Complaint 
alleged that the price of water charged by Respondents varied from $4,500 per share to 
profit in form only' and allegations [that] the changes in share distribution disrupt the 
commonality of interest requirement, the allegations must still show that [SWDC] serves 
the public generally." (R. 23:10-11.) 
Also, Section 54-4-1 does not limit the Commission's jurisdiction to "typical 
shareholder complaints" but instead directs the Commission to "supervise all of the 
business" of a public utility. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1. 
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$15,000 per share. (R. 1:6-8.) Because it is reasonable to infer that such charges are 
passed on to the consumer as a connection or hook-up fee, (R. 12:13 n.20), it cannot be 
legitimately argued that SWDC consumers pay a fair and equal rate for culinary water. 
SWDC also states that "there are no allegations that [SWDC] shareholders have no 
say regarding the rates and operations of the company." (Br. of SWDC at 32.) However, 
such a statement is false. The Complaint clearly alleged that, due to the additional shares 
issued to the Saunders/Knowles Respondents to ensure that Saunders and Knowles 
continue to maintain their iron grip on SWDC, the non-consumer Saunders/Knowles 
Respondents "owned approximately 80% of the Class A (development) shares and 52% 
of SWDC's total issued and outstanding shares." (R. 1 at K 87.) "Consequently, it would 
require the agreement of only Saunders and Knowles to outvote the interests of the Class 
B shareholders." (R.l at f^ 88.) The Complaint further alleged that, "[bjecause of their 
minority shareholder status, Class B (use) shareholders, which are SWDC's rate-paying 
consumer-members, do not have it in their power to elect other directors, which are 
elected by a simple majority vote, and demand necessary changes or control the rate-
making process." (R.l at f^ 93.) In other words, SWDC's consumers have no ability to 
ensure their rights and interests are not harmed. The non-consumer Saunders/Knowles 
Respondents may, at their pleasure, unilaterally raise delivery rates or impose 
assessments and the consumer shareholders could do absolutely nothing about it. 
SWDC also argues that its articles and bylaws protect the consumer-shareholders 
and ensure that there is no need for regulation. However, once again, this "form over 
substance" argument fails to recognize the reality of what is occurring as a result of 
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Saunders' and Knowles' control over SWDC. As alleged in the Complaint, the non-
consumer Saunders/Knowles Respondents own more than half of all outstanding SWDC 
shares. Because Class C and Class D shares are non-voting, (R.l at f 81), there is 
absolutely no opportunity for the minority Class B shareholders, the actual consumers of 
SWDC's culinary water, to outvote the Saunders/Knowles Respondents. Thus, any 
provisions granting Class B shareholders the ability to participate in the governance of 
SWDC are meaningless given that SWDC is owned and controlled by non-consumer 
shareholders, i.e., Saunders and Knowles. 
Also, although the articles and bylaws require contribution of water rights before 
shares may be issued, the Complaint does not allege that the Saunders/Knowles 
Respondents' shares have been issued in accordance with such requirements. Rather, the 
Complaint alleges that Saunders and Knowles have caused SWDC to issue them 
additional shares "so that [they] always maintain control of SWDC and can profit from 
the sale of Class A shares."15 (R.l at \ 41.) An evaluation of SWDC's water rights 
shows that SWDC owns water sufficient to provide water to only one-third of all shares 
issued by the Company. (R.l at \ 70.) This means that the issuance of additional shares 
to Saunders and Knowles without the required contributiop of water rights is subjecting 
15
 Contrary to SWDC's claim that there is no allegation that Saunders and Knowles have 
actually profited from their sales of shares, the Complaint alleges that Saunders and 
Knowles sell shares "for profit" and "at a substantial premium." (R.l at fflf 27, 92.) 
SWDC also argues that Bear Hollow has engaged in! the same conduct as Saunders 
and Knowles by offering to sell its surplus shares. However, there can be no comparison 
between a shareholder's attempts to sell surplus shares that cannot be used for the 
development to which they are tied and Saunders and Knowles, who have formed a 
partnership to actively sell SWDC's culinary water at substantial premiums. 
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the consumers to a dangerous game of "musical chairs," creating a substantial risk that 
the consumers will not receive the water to which they are entitled once all Class A 
shares are converted to Class B (use) shares. As this problem is only compounded each 
time Saunders and Knowles cause additional shares to be issued to them, such conduct 
can only be remedied by the Commission's investigation, oversight, and regulation. 
II. SAUNDERS AND KNOWLES CONTROL, MANIPULATE, AND 
OPERATE SWDC AS A VAST, FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE 
Despite Respondents' protestations to the contrary, Bear Hollow does not contend 
that jurisdiction is proper over the Saunders/Knowles Respondents due to their status as 
shareholders of SWDC.16 Rather, Bear Hollow asserts that the Saunders/Knowles 
Respondents' conduct, which entails, according to their own admission, the "retail sale 
of culinary water [through the sale of their Class A shares]" (R. 11, Ex.A at f 39), 
constitutes ownership and control over "real estate" or "personal property owned, 
It is for this reason that the Saunders/Knowles Respondents' allusion to Warren Buffet 
fails. Clearly, Mr. Buffet should not be subject to the Commission's jurisdiction simply 
because he owns shares in Berkshire Hathaway. However, if Mr. Buffet were to use his 
status as a controlling shareholder to personally engage in the business of selling 
connections to electrical service, at whatever prices he dictated, there should be no 
question that his activities would subject him to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 
17
 The Saunders/Knowles Respondents argue that their Anti-Trust Complaint was not 
properly presented to the Commission. However, as discussed above, the Anti-Trust 
Complaint was properly before the Commission and is part of the record on appeal. 
Also, as noted above, this Court may take judicial notice of the Anti-Trust Complaint. 
The Saunders/Knowles Respondents also argue that their admissions made in the 
Anti-Trust Complaint are taken out of context in that they are just a few paragraphs from 
"one of the tens of thousands of pages of filings in that case." (Br. of Saunders/Knowles 
Resp. ("S/K Resp.") at 18 n.ll .) However, what the Saunders/Knowles Respondents fail 
to recognize is that Bear Hollow attached the entire Anti-Trust Complaint to its opposing 
memorandum and that the Anti-Trust Complaint is the operative complaint in that action. 
No superseding or amended complaint has been filed in that case. 
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controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the ... sale ... of 
water," thereby qualifying the Saunders/Knowles Respondents as owning or controlling a 
"water system." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(30)(a). Bear Hollow also argues that the 
Saunders/Knowles Respondents' manipulation of SWDC'^ operations subject them to the 
Commission's jurisdiction in accordance with the statutory directive that the Commission 
"supervise all of the business of every ... public utility in this state, and ... do all things, 
whether herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or 
convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1; 
see also id, § 54-7-21 ("The commission shall see that the provisions of the ... statutes ... 
affecting public utilities ... are enforced and obeyed, ahd that violations thereof are 
promptly prosecuted . . . .") . 
Mischaracterizing Bear Hollow's position, the Saunders/Knowles Respondents 
claim that Bear Hollow has not cited to any statutes or Commission decisions under 
which an individual is deemed to be subject to the Commission's jurisdiction "simply 
because they owned or controlled a distinct legal entity." (Br. of Saunders/Knowles 
Resp. at 13.) However, while individuals are not subject to jurisdiction based solely on 
their shareholder status, Sections 54-7-26 and 54-7-28 clearly establish that the 
Commission may assert jurisdiction over any individuals that have engaged in conduct 
violative of the statutes governing public utilities or have aided or abetted a public utility 
1 O 
to engage in such conduct. And, as established by the Commission's Notice of Hearing 
The Saunders/Knowles Respondents argue that Bear Hollow failed to raise this issue in 
its Request for Rehearing. However, not only did Bear Hollow argue that the 
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in the Daniels Summit Estates Water Company, Docket No. 04-2436-01, attached to Bear 
Hollow's opening brief as Addendum I, the Commission has exercised the authority 
granted it by such statutes to conduct investigations to determine whether officers of a 
public utility should be subject to sanctions. Because Bear Hollow's Complaint alleges 
that the Saunders/Knowles Respondents have engaged in conduct in violation of the 
public utility statutes and have also caused SWDC to do the same, (R.l at \% 28-38, 41, 
70-71, 119, 124-25), the Commission erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to 
investigate the Saunders/Knowles Respondents' conduct. 
While the Saunders/Knowles Respondents attempt to minimize their conduct by 
characterizing it as "limited transactions" that do not constitute serving the public 
generally, (Br. of S/K Resp. at 21), such a characterization is in stark contrast to their 
Anti-Trust Complaint admissions that they "were the leading, largest and strongest 
competitor for the retail sale, distribution and delivery of water in the Snyderville Basin," 
(R. l l , Ex.A at ^ 55), and to the Complaint's allegations, which allege that the 
Saunders/Knowles Respondents "are marketing a valuable public resource—water—by 
Commission has "consistently interpreted its jurisdiction to include the officers and 
individuals operating or controlling a water corporation," it specifically cited to the 
Daniels Summit Estates Order to Show Cause, which concerned whether Daniels Summit 
Estates' officer should "face the criminal sanctions provided by statute." (R. 24:5 n.2; Br. 
ofBear Hollow, Add. I at 1.) 
The Saunders/Knowles Respondents also argue that Section 54-7-28 is not 
applicable because Bear Hollow did not request criminal sanctions be issued. (Br. of S/K 
Resp. at 17.) However, it must be noted that, in addition to a request that the 
Commission commence an inquiry to determine whether the Saunders/Knowles 
Respondents should be regulated as a public utility, Bear Hollow's Complaint also 
requested that the Commission "initiate all other necessary and proper proceedings to 
assert Commission jurisdiction and regulation over the [Saunders/Knowles] Respondents 
as the Commission, in its discretion, deems necessary." (R.l at f^ 140.) 
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selling Class A shares at whatever prices they dictate" and are "maintaining a monopoly 
or near-monopoly on the purchase of Class A shares." (R.l at ff 124-25.) The 
Saunders/Knowles Respondents have presented nothing fo contradict such admissions 
and allegations. Thus, it must be assumed, for purposes Of their motion to dismiss, that 
their sale of culinary water is as extensive as alleged. As such conduct constitutes 
"owning, controlling, operating, or managing any water system for public service," the 
Commission erred in granting the Saunders/Knowles Respondents' motion to dismiss. 
III. THE COMMISSION'S RULING CONSTITUTES DE FACTO RULE 
MAKING 
Despite the fact that the Commission's ruling ii)i the present case is wholly 
inconsistent with, and, in fact, contradictory to, Rule R746-331-1, thereby necessitating 
the Commission's after-the-fact repeal of that rule, SWDC argues that the Commission's 
ruling merely clarified how to apply Supreme Court precedent and therefore does not 
constitute de facto rule making. However, such an argument cannot stand in light of this 
Court's holding in Williams v. Public Service Comm % 72d P.2d 773 (Utah 1986). 
In Williams, this Court declared that a "rule is defined as a statement of general 
applicability ... that implements or interprets the law oif prescribes the policy of the 
agency in the administration of its functions." Id. at 775 (internal quotations omitted) 
(alteration in original). Relying on this definition, the Williams Court held that "the 
Commission cannot reverse its long-settled position regarding the scope of its jurisdiction 
and announce a fundamental policy change without following the requirements of the 
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act." Id. at 777. 
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In an attempt to distinguish Williams from the present case, SWDC argues that the 
Commission's order was not a change in law but was instead "merely a clarification." 
(Br. of SWDC at 36.) However, as shown by In re Boulder King, the Commission's 
Order in this case was not a mere clarification but was instead a complete abandonment 
of its rule and the long-applied requirements necessary to establish an exemption from 
Commission regulation. Indeed, in Boulder King, the Commission expressly rejected the 
very argument advanced by SWDC in the proceedings below, declaring, 
Boulder King claims that because it is a nonprofit corporation which serves 
only its owning members with each lot having one vote, that it is not a 
"public utility." We disagree.... The fact that it is a nonprofit corporation 
owned by the owners of lots in the Boulder Kings Ranch Estates 
subdivision does not cause it to be exempt from regulation. The statutes set 
forth above that define "water corporation" and "water system" do exempt 
from regulation systems engaged in distribution of irrigation water to their 
stockholders. There is no similar exemption for culinary systems. 
{Boulder King at 3, Br. of Bear Hollow, Add. H, (first and second emphasis added).)19 
Though the Commission found Boulder King's reliance on Garkane "misplaced" 
because Boulder King "did not have the ability to choose its members," (id.), the 
Commission also held that "[t]he reasoning of the Garkane decision is incorporated into 
Commission rule R746-331." (Id.) Because Boulder King "fail[ed] to meet at least two 
of the requirements of that rule," (id.), the Commission held that the company did not 
19
 SWDC claims that the Boulder King decision was based solely on the fact that Boulder 
King could not choose its members as required by Garkane. (Br. of SWDC at 38.) In 
addition to the fact that the Boulder King decision clearly applied the requirements of 
Rule 746-331-1, it should be noted that SWDC's argument actually supports a reversal of 
the Commission's order in this case as Bear Hollow has likewise alleged that SWDC 
does not have the ability to choose its members. 
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"qualify for exemption from regulation."20 {Id. at 5.) Thi}s, Boulder King demonstrates 
that Rule R746-331-1 constituted the "Garkane" test of the Commission's jurisdiction. 
In this case, the Commission did not simply fai| to apply Rule R746-331-1. 
Rather, it adopted an interpretation of its jurisdiction that is completely contrary to the 
Rule, representing an abandonment of its prior precedent. Recognizing the 
irreconcilable conflict between the Rule and its Order ipcx this case, the Commission 
attempted to belatedly comply with the Rulemaking A^t by repealing R746-331-1. 
However, such an attempt could not retroactively validate i1(s invalid order. 
SWDC also argues that the Commission's Order in tiiis case does not constitute a 
departure from the Commission's prior practice of asserting jurisdiction over individuals 
controlling and operating a water system in a manner inconsistent with the governing 
statutes. In support of this argument, SWDC asserts that thp Order to Show Cause issued 
in Daniels Summit, cited by Bear Hollow, merely indicate^ the Commission's "intent to 
determine whether the officers should be fined for their failure to respond to the Division 
of Public Utilities." (Br. of SWDC at 39.) However, this Characterization is inaccurate. 
20
 The Commission has similarly applied R746-331-1 to cither non-profit mutual water 
companies in determining whether those entities should be exempted from regulation. 
See, e.g., In re East Kanab Water Co., Docket No. 02-2209-01, at 1 (April 16, 2002), 
attached hereto as Addendum A ("We find that with th£ changed ownership, voting 
control of the Company is distributed in a way that each member enjoys a complete 
commonality of interest, as a consumer, such that rate regulation would be superfluous, 
and the Company otherwise meets the requirements of Rule 746-33 l-l(C)."). 
SWDC argues that the Commission applied a similar interpretation in In re Deepwater 
Distribution Co., Inc., Docket No. 09-2516-01 (Nov. 30, 2009). However, it must be 
noted that the Commission's decision in Deepwater was issued just two months before its 
Order in this case. Up until that time, the Commission had consistently applied R746-
331-1 as its test for jurisdiction. And, although the Commission issued its aberrant ruling 
in Deepwater, it took no action to repeal R746-331-1 until apter its ruling in this case. 
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The Order demanded that the individual officer show cause as to why he should not face 
sanctions for "failure to comply with UCA § 54-4-25 requiring a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity prior to utility operation." {Daniels Summit at 2, Br. of Bear 
Hollow, Add. I.) Contrary to this precedent of asserting jurisdiction over officers aiding 
or abetting a public utility in violating Utah law, the Commission concluded in the 
present case that it could not commence an investigation to determine "whether any or 
some of the shareholders do or do not 'own, control, manipulate or dominate' [SWDC]." 
(R. 23:9.) As this conclusion is contrary to the Commission's precedent, the Order 
dismissing Bear Hollow's Complaint as against the Saunders/Knowles Respondents 
constituted prohibited de facto rulemaking and should be reversed. 
IV. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BEAR HOLLOW 
COULD NOT AMEND ITS COMPLAINT DURING THE REQUEST 
FOR RECONSIDERATION PERIOD 
In responding to this issue, the Respondents allege that Bear Hollow has misstated 
the standard of review, arguing that the issue does not present a question of law but 
instead involves the Commission's application of its own procedural rules. However, this 
argument fails to recognize that the Commission did not simply refuse to exercise its 
discretion in allowing an amendment to Bear Hollow's Complaint. Instead, the 
Commission held that, based upon Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976), Bear 
Hollow "cannot amend its complaint at this point." (R. 27:1 (emphasis added).) Such a 
ruling does not involve the interpretation or application of the Commission's rules. 
Rather, the ruling presents a question of law regarding whether a petitioner may ever 
move to amend a complaint during the reconsideration period. Because the courts have 
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answered the question in the affirmative, holding that a l^arty may move to amend if it 
has filed a timely Rule 59(e) or 60(b) motion, see Natiohal Adver. Co. v. Murray City 
Corp., 2006 UT App 75, ffif 13-15, 131 P.3d 872, the Commission's conclusion that Bear 
Hollow "cannot" amend its complaint is erroneous as a matter of law. 
The Saunders/Knowles Respondents also argue that consideration of Bear 
Hollow's Amended Complaint would be contrary to publiq policy because it would allow 
Bear Hollow to "unilaterally moot" the Commission's efforts in resolving the motions to 
dismiss and would provide Bear Hollow a second bite at the apple. However, in so 
arguing, the Saunders/Knowles Respondents fail to understand one key aspect in this 
case. The Complaint was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As such, the 
Commission's order lacks any preclusive effect, and Bear Hollow is free to bring another 
complaint at any time. See SMP, Inc. v. Kirkman, 843 I .^2d 531, 533 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) ("It is axiomatic that before we will apply res judicata to the prior adjudication of a 
claim, the prior adjudicating tribunal must have had subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the claim on its merits."). Thus, forcing the patties to incur the expense and 
effort in briefing this appeal, when the need for such an appeal could have been mooted 
by consideration of Bear Hollow's amended complaint, is contrary to the policies of 
judicial efficiency and economy. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Bear Hollow requests that this Court reverse the 
Commission's order and remand the cause to the Commission for further proceedings. 
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DATED this 1^3 day of October, 2010. 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
Si 
J- ksDi 
Kathryn J. Steffey 
Attorneys for Petitioner Bear Hollow 
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ADDENDA 
(A) In re East Kanab Water Co., Docket No. 02-2209-01 (April 16, 2002). 
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Petition of the 
DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES for 
cancellation of the Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity of EAST 
[KANAB WATER COMPANY | 
P 
P 
V y 
DOCKET NO. 02-2209-01 
REPORT AND ORDER 
Cancellation of Certificate No. 2828 
ISSUED: April 16. 2002 
SYNOPSIS 
East Kanab Water Company having requested that its certificate of public convenience and necessity be 
canceled, the Commission so orders. 
By The Commission: 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
East Kanab Water Company (the "Company") was organized as a non-profit mutual water company, and 
is so registered with the Division of Corporations. On January 22, 1996, the Company was issued a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity, certificate number 2828, because at the time of its 
application the majority of the shares were held or controlled by the developer. The Company has since 
provided water service in its certificated territory. 
In a letter dated February 6, 2002, the Company requested that the Commission cancel its authority and 
issue a letter of exemption. In support, the Company provided a detailed list of all shareholders showing 
that a majority of its shares are now owned by individuals. The division investigated and recommended 
that the Company's request be granted. 
We find that with the changed ownership, voting control of the Company is distributed in a way that 
each member enjoys a complete commonality of interest, as a consumer, such that rate regulation would 
be superfluous, and the Company otherwise meets the requirements of Rule 746-331-1 (C). 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity No. 2828 issued to East Kanab Water Company by 
Commission order dated January 26, 1996, be and hereby is canceleq. 
Any person aggrieved by this Order may petition the Commission for review within 20 days of the date 
of this Order. Failure to do so will forfeit the right to appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 16th day of April, 2002. 
Isl Stephen F. Mechanu Chairman 
I si Constance B. White, Commissioner 
Isl Richard M. CampbelL Commissioner 
Attest: 
Isl Julie Orchard 
Commission Secretary 
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